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8This article was written in 1990 and is published here for the first time. As the
title implies, it is in response to an article written by Norwegian philosopher 
Hans  Skjervheim. That article, “Ad Skjervheim,” is in Norwegian only; it 
appeared first in a journal and was reprinted in 1997 in a collection of 
Skjervheim’s work edited by Hermund Slaattelid.  hat can I do except join Skjervheim1 in his efforts to clarify and reject 
he absolutistic ‘scientism’ of Lévi-Strauss? But I can do it only with 
ome trepidation because of the difference between the methodological 
argon of Lévi-Strauss and that of myself. An example: the former says 
hat “the model should be so constituted as to make immediately 
ntelligible all the observed facts.”2 Either Lévi-Strauss uses the word 
model’ so differently from myself that no ‘yes’ or ‘no’ is relevant in 
he discussion, or I must say NO with the feeling of desperation. The 
unction of models is such that if it covers, and even makes intelligible, 
all’ pertinent observations, then it is not a model. Models are highly 
elective. And how can he use the word ‘fact’ in this connection? An 
nthropologist notes down that two members of such and such culture 
lay (fight, make an axe, blame each other . . .). His conceptual 
ramework is his own, however talented he is in putting “himself in the 
lace of the people living there”3 and, also, however clever his 
heoretical models. 
 
n my favourite terminology of the ’30s and later, the anthropologist 
itnesses things rather than observes. With his witness reports 
unctioning as a sort of raw material, he successively eliminates or 
hanges those sentences which manifestly reveal the provinciality of his 
riginal concepts. Thus, if he stated “then the friends shook hands,” he 
ay be correct because of increasing evidence that ‘friendship’ as “we” 
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understand it is not their concept, and because the reaction sequence 
named ‘shaking hands’ does not have that significance. 
  
So, where are the ‘facts’? 
  
Suppose anthropologists from cultures A, B, and C compare each 
others’ reports as witnesses and their laboriously constructed accounts 
of the social relations of the Balinese. Why should we believe in a kind 
of true scientific account of those relations? The greater the differences 
between A, B, and C, the greater, on the whole, will be the differences 
in their accounts. If very great, the classification of all three as 
‘anthropologists’ gets to be rather shaky. Which are the maximum 
methodological divergencies possible with the conceptualization 
‘anthropologist’? 
  
We may assume that by means of scientific methods of some sort we 
are able to reduce the differences between the three accounts of the 
social relations of the Balinese. But even if against all odds, the number 
of differences could be reduced to zero, the appearance of a fourth 
anthropologist, D, belonging to a young generation is likely to shatter 
the artificial joint account constructed by A, B, and C. 
  
The problems faced are essentially the same as those facing us when we 
try to formulate a definition of a term, e.g., ‘democracy,’ on the basis of 
a set of use occurrences of the term. Or, the construction of a 
characterization of a Verhaltensweise corresponding to the cognitive 
content of ‘the distance between Sun and Earth is 149.5 million km.’ 
based on a set of descriptions of behaviours (verbal and non-verbal) of 
scientists. 
  
Pluralism is inescapable, and nothing to lament. Reality is one, but if 
accounts of it are identical, this only reveals cultural poverty. Excessive 
belief in ‘science’ favours acceptance of poverty as a sign of truth. 
  
According to Lévi-Strauss, good models will save us from pluralism 
because of their intimate relation to what he calls ‘reality,’ sometimes 
even ‘deep reality.’ 
  
Strauss’s references to Freud are important in this connection.  
  
The concepts used by Freud in order to describe the function of the 
unconscious are socially understandable. “I intended to kill my father” 
may be unacceptable to the patient at a certain stage of the 
psychoanalysis, but patricide is part of a set of understandable social 
Festschrift Section, Volume 22, Number 1 (2006) 81
concepts. Physicists may introduce completely new concepts like 
“quarks” in fundamental explanation (i.e., on the top level of hypo-
deductive systems). But social scientists must, I presume, narrow down 
the areas basic concepts in his models to that of socially amused 
acceptance, such as that we really are mere appendages of selfish 
genes,4 but this conceptualization is useless in social science. The 
‘realness’ Dawkins asserts is only one in relation to certain biological 
models. 
  
It is amusing to imagine that we are only appendages of certain kinds, 
just as it is entertaining to think of ourselves as swarms of atoms, or as 
many-dimensional oceans of probability waves. If we live long enough 
we can look forward to a series of new wonderful models superbly 
popularized by eminent natural scientists. 
  
In short, if Lévi-Strauss relies on models from the most modern natural 
science, logic, and mathematics, the pluralism is not only inescapable, 
but very clearly stated in modern general methodology. The models are 
mutually inconsistent; otherwise, change of models would be only 
moderately interesting. If we think of reality as one, and I do not see 
how we can avoid that, the relation of the models to reality cannot be 
but indirect. They cannot put us in touch with deeper layers of reality in 
the way Freud tried to do. His conceptualizations served the aim to 
make our feelings and actions more understandable. 
  
The astonishing success of physical models since Galileo justifies the 
belief that they somehow picture something real and independent of 
cultural differences among scientists. The equations seem ‘themselves’ 
to be independent, but their use and interpretations are always 
dependent. 
  
Against what I have said so far, it may be argued that it is absolutistic: 
the pluralist conclusion is asserted ‘monistically’ at a higher meta-level. 
The pluralism is part of a total view which is not mentioned. If Lévi-
Strauss has a different total view, my arguments for pluralism may be 
misconceived, irrelevant, or simply not understandable from his point 
of view. 
  
It would lead too far to go into the problems of total views. Suffice it to 
say that some of my formulations are purposely made absolutist in 
order to remind the reader of those problems. This holds, e.g., for the 
bombastic sentence “Pluralism is inescapable . . .” When I work toward 
a total view, pluralism gets increasingly ‘obvious,’ or gets to be 
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derivable with increased rigour from fundamental norms and 
hypotheses. 
  
With Skjervheim I agree that Lévi-Strauss seems to favour a kind of 
scientific absolutism. I would add “with an atomist flavour” considering 
his ideal of “reintegrating culture and nature and finally of life within 
the whole of its physico-chemical conditions.”5 Atomism I understand 
as the opposite of gestalt thinking, that is, thinking in terms of ever 
more comprehensive wholes, and stressing the non-reducibility of 
higher order wholes to lower order wholes. Classical examples: 
melodies to sequences of noises or even tones, propositions or units of 
intended meaning to sentences or formulations, Verhaltensweisen or 
operations to reactions. 
  
Mathematics, chemistry, socio-biology, and other branches of science 
are of heuristic help to social scientists as ‘auxiliary sciences.’ But they 
do not help to dissolve sciences of man. They do not dissolve any thing 
or process. ‘Reduction’ as a part of the scientific enterprise must be 
understood in a different way.6
  
Skjervheim’s way of saying essentially the same or similar things to 
what I have so far said in this article is often not my way. The 
difference is instructive, but not easy to pin down in clear words. In 
what follows I shall try to clarify disagreements about how to interpret 
some points in my Erkenntnis und wissenschaftliches Verhalten (“E”). 
  
The biologist and philosopher von Üexküll worked out clearer than 
others that each species has a set of different reactions applied in 
different kinds of situations (defined by the biologists!). The world each 
lives in as an experienced world has the number of discriminable 
features which manifest in a number of kinds of reactions. This is all 
very inspiring except that every reaction and situation is of course 
described in terms of the human observer, as features of his world. 
  
Now, if we as cultural anthropologists try to “study men as if they were 
ants,”7 the reactions and situation we describe in our witness reports on 
culture B is in terms of our own particular culture A. The culture B 
cannot be described except as something completely within the 
cognitive framework of A. The world of B is either naively pictured as 
a part of the world of A or else said only to have an abstract structure 
corresponding (isomorphically) to a non-abstract structure within the 
world of A. 
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When it is said that a person, N. N., within a culture, B, thinks he or she 
is actually identical with a particular animal, the terms person, identical 
and animal (etc.) possess the connotations they have in A. We, 
members of A, get an exciting picture of B, but we should not pretend 
we can experience the world of B through the connotations of words 
belonging to A. If we do, we succumb to the mistake of ‘maze-
epistemology.’ (We describe the movement of an animal in a maze 
without clearly recognizing that the maze is a feature of our 
experienced world rather than of that of the animal.) 
  
The cultural provinciality of anthropologists can be reduced through 
successive (endless) modifications of their accounts. In the example 
given above, the member of culture A will try to find out how people in 
B experience what we call animals, persons, and identities. Another 
example: how can Sherpas seem to say (in their language) that the 
mountain Tseringma is a mountain and a princess? How can we 
translate, if at all, their verbal utterances in such a way that we 
approximate their experience of Tseringma? The attempts to do so 
result in a plurality of versions. 
  
Strangely enough, the successive approximations—if such are at all 
forthcoming—are reached by successive steps of methodological 
alienation: We start treating the members of B as colleagues: the 
Sherpas assert ‘mistakenly’ that Tseringma also is a princess. Then we 
retreat from them, allowing for the possibility that their concept of a 
mountain is not the same as ours, nor is that of a person, nor their use of 
language. We may even start looking for evidence that identification 
somehow is differently conceived. 
  
If very successful we may be able roughly to experience the world as a 
member of culture B, still retaining the ability somehow to describe the 
experience in the language of A. But with further approximations this 
ability gradually vanishes: it is a basic feature of the experience within 
culture B, that it does not somehow contain the consciousness of being 
different from A. As long as the cultural anthropologist walks round 
with his notebook in mind, his experience is in one fundamental way 
different from that of B. 
  
The eminent cultural anthropologist Fredrik Barth sometimes writes as 
if humans are capable of going in and out of many different cultures, 
participating in each word they define. I presume he does not pretend to 
grasp more than fragments.8 If he went in deep I presume it would be 
next to impossible to get out. 
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Literally speaking, everything is affected by a culture—including the 
primary sense qualities like length and breadth. The size of coins 
perceived by members of the culture in which the coin is used is 
perceived differently according to its value.9 An axe is full of cultural 
traits, and in at least one culture it is perceived as a status symbol in a 
way so complicated that it would take years to adjust one’s behaviour to 
its cultural ontology. The repugnance toward lack of intelligence is so 
pervasive in our competitive civilization that rats classed as dull are 
treated worse than those classed as bright—with the effect that the 
former perform even worse than necessary.10 Cultural priorities 
determine behaviour in ways completely unknown to the participants. 
  
The terms behavioural and behaviourism are usually associated with 
the doctrines of J. B. Watson and other ‘molecular’ behaviourists, not 
with the ‘molar’ behaviourism of E. C. Tolman. The difference is 
philosophically essential because the molar view is an intentional 
view.11 In E, I use the Tolmanian conception of behaviour as action, not 
reaction. The term Verhaltensweise, way of behaviour, is not 
observable as a succession of movements or reactions. 
  
Skjervheim suggests that in my earlier work (E) “behaviour” did not yet 
have intentional import. I disagree. Perhaps I did not make it clear 
enough that the ‘stranger from another planet’ whom I introduce for 
certain purposes, is not a Tolmanian behaviourist? My Verhaltenswise 
was meant to offer a synthesis of Erkenntnisinhal (cognitive content) 
and Erkenntnistätigkeit (cognition as act). Only inherently purposeful 
ways of behaviour could represent cognitions as acts and content—in 
the kind of science of science envisaged. 
  
When operationists like Bridgman insisted that in science of science 
one should not listen to scientists but see what they do, I stressed that in 
that case one should not even listen to how scientists define their 
various operations, but must take up the attitude of the anthropologists 
or even the rat psychologist in observing the scientist. An illustration: 
 
A: What do those two scientists do? 
B: They each perform an x-ray measurement. 
A: But they move very differently. Look at their arms. 
B: Nonsense: The one is left-handed, the other right-handed. You must 
understand that those differences in reactions are totally irrelevant. 
A: But what do they do now? They behave very differently.  
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B: Nonsense. They still perform an x-ray measurement. One of them 
smokes a cigarette, the other sings. You must understand that it is a 
completely irrelevant difference. 
 
In so far as ‘x-ray measurement’ is a kind of Verhaltensweise, it is a 
complicated task to describe it in terms of relevant and only relevant 
traits. But if that could be done, the intentional aspect would be 
included, simply in terms of relevance. Intentionality does not manifest 
itself in pure consciousness, but in units of verbal and non-verbal 
behaviours. 
  
This is the point of view of E, and I accept it. But just as a cultural 
anthropologist starts out using uncritically the conceptual framework of 
his own culture, the science of science specialist starts out as a 
colleague of the scientists, that is, methodologically as a ‘witness.’ The 
kind of scientist of science envisaged in E tries step by step to get rid of 
the prejudices due to cultural affiliation. But where does this end? I 
agree with Skjervheim that there is a limit beyond which the scientist of 
the science B cannot any longer be said to understand B, or more 
precisely, does not produce an account of B that makes B 
understandable. I think the molar behavioural (objektiv psychologische) 
account envisional in E is inside the limits, whereas that of the 
“researcher from a strange planet” is outside. He establishes a science 
of science of sorts, and according to the stated assumptions, one in a 
strange, but perfect way, explains the difference in cognitive content 
between various human hypotheses about the distance of the sun. He is 
in one way completely inside (and perhaps very proud of this), but at 
the same time hopelessly outside in another way. Call it the 
hermeneutical way, if you insist. 
Notes 
                                                 
1 Hans Skjervheim, “Ad Skjervheim,” in Regime under Kritikk: Om Hans Skjervheim 
I Norsk Filosofi Og Samfunnsdebatt, edited by Hermund Slaattelid, Oslo: Aschehoug, 
1997. pp. 49–53. Skjervheim addressed the same topics in “Objectivism and the Study 
of Man,” in Positivism, Dialectikk, Materialisme. Den Norske Debatten om 
SamfunnsuitenKapenes Teori, edited by R. Sladstad, Oslo: Universitetsforlag, 1976. 
2 Quoted on p. 6 in Skjervheim’s article. 
3  See quotation on p. 8. 
4  For example, Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, 1976, New York and Oxford, 
Oxford University Press. 
5 Cp.p.13. 
6 Cp. Bonner, J. T., The Evolution of Culture in Animals, Princeton 1980, about 
culture in animals and man. 
7 Lévi-Strauss, cp. p. 13. 
8  F. Barth, Andres Liv - og vårt eget, Oslo: Gyldendal, 1980, p. 32. 
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9  E. Brunswik. 
10  R. Rosenthal & K. Frode. 
 11After the War when E. Brunswik and myself were going to write the psychology 
volume for the Encyclopedia of Unified Science, even the mellow and sophisticated 
behaviourism of E. C. Tolman and Brunswik was too rigorous and antimentalististic for 
me. Our ways parted. Brunswik wrote a highly competent volume alone. 
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